Home
Reading
Searching
Subscribe
Sponsors
Statistics
Posting
Contact
Spam
Lists
Links
About
Hosting
Filtering
Features Download
Marketing
Archives
FAQ
Blog
 
Gmane
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59 <at> srcf.ucam.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Newsgroups: gmane.linux.kernel.lsm
Date: Saturday 3rd November 2012 13:46:31 UTC (over 4 years ago)
On Sat, Nov 03, 2012 at 12:03:56PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sat, 2012-11-03 at 00:22 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > Why would an attacker use one of those Linux systems? There's going to 
> > be plenty available that don't have that restriction.
> 
> It's called best practices.  If someone else releases something that
> doesn't conform to them, then it's their signing key in jeopardy, not
> yours.  You surely must see that the goal of securing "everything"
> against "anything" isn't achievable because if someone releases a
> bootloader not conforming to the best practices, why would they have
> bothered to include your secure boot lockdowns in their kernel.  In
> other words, you lost ab initio, so it's pointless to cite this type of
> thing as a rationale for a kernel lockdown patch.

I... what? Our signed bootloader will boot our signed kernel without any 
physically present end-user involvement. We therefore need to make it 
as difficult as practically possible for an attacker to use our signed 
bootloader and our signed kernel as an attack vector against other 
operating systems, which includes worrying about hibernate and kexec. If 
people want to support this use case then patches to deal with that need 
to be present in the upstream kernel.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | [email protected]
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
 
CD: 3ms