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Gmane

From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w <at> public.gmane.org>
Subject: Lyra2 initial review
Newsgroups: gmane.comp.security.phc
Date: Wednesday 16th April 2014 18:32:09 UTC (over 4 years ago)
After reading some of the Lyra2 source code for pebbling, I got into it a
bit.  Here's my initial thoughts.

First of all, I am impressed.  If Lyra2 is chosen over Yescript and
TwoCats, I will not be upset, because password hashing security will still
have been significantly enhanced.  Lyra2, in my view, after fixing a few
things, is good enough.  I consider it the only other strong generic
high-memory hashing candidate besides Yescript and TwoCats, as the others
are either much slower, or have no strategy for dealing with cache-miss
penalties when hashing large amounts of external DRAM.  I call this the
"Scrypt inspired" category in other posts.  I still feel that Yescript is a
better platform for more advanced features such as ROM, Bcrypt-like GPU
defense, and multi-threading with TMTO defense (forcing threads to run in
parallel), and I think Alexander can do better than either me or the Lyra2
team at getting several of these fine points right.  However, if we're
mainly looking for an improvement over Script, I think Lyra2 delivers.
 It's very good work.

Here's some points I like.  Being a speed freak, I like it's speed!  It has
the second highest memory hashing speed for 1 thread, not counting EARWORM,
which is even faster, but a very different animal.  On my development
machine (3.4GHz Core i7 Ivy Bridge running 64-bit Arch Linix) the Lyra2 SSE
version does, with t_cost == 1, and m_cost == 100,000:

1.47GiB/s of memory hashing (.57GiB/.39s) peak
1.10GiB/s average
4.41 GiB/s DRAM bandwidth

It fills memory for the 1st half, and overwrites memory in the second half,
so average memory usage is about 75% of peak for t_cost == 1, which is how
I would normally run Lyra2.  For DRAM bandwidth, Lyra2 reads on average
every location once, and writes it twice, for 3X the memory size of total
data transfer.  For comparison, the fastest version of Script is
Alexander's Yescript when run in Script compatibility mode.  On my machine,
it does:

0.74GiB/s of memory hashing (2GiB/2.71s) peak
0.56GiB/s average
1.5GiB/s DRAM bandwidth

Yescript maxes out bandwidth with extra threads, so this is not the most
critical benchmark.  However, Lyra2's speed looks good!  TwoCats, with a
custom memory hashing function rather than reduced-round Blake2 or Salsa,
is faster yet:

3.85GiB/s of memory hashing (2GiB/.52s) peak
1.92GiB/s average
7.7GiB/s DRAM bandwidth

There's more that I like about Lyra2.  It uses what I call a "hybrid:
architecture, where the first loop is cache-timing resistant and does no
password-dependent memory addressiong, and the second loop is unpredictable
and does password dependent addressing.  This, in my opinion, is the
sweet-spot where we retain the strong memory*time defense of unpredictable
algorithms, while having some cache-timing defense.

I also like the custom blake2-b based sponge.  This is quite a bit faster
than the Keccak based sponges used in other entries, and is somewhat slower
in hardware than Keccak, both of which help defenders.  The Lyra2 team got
the PRK derivation right, and is a "Strongly secure" algorithm, in that it
hashes all the inputs and their lengths, eliminating the input collisions I
see in several other entries.

Not only is the custom sponge cool, but the Lyra2 team is one of the few
that bothered to do substantial SSE optimization up-front. When designing
TwoCats, I found that separating the design of the inner hashing loop from
SSE optimization was nearly impossible.  You just can't separate design and
optimization.  The Lyra2 team did design and optimization at the same time,
enabling them to achieve very high speeds, which is something many of the
other entries will not be able to duplicate now that the design phase is
mostly over.

There are also things I didn't like about Lyra2, and places where I think
Lyra2 needs improvement or fixing.

First, Lyra2 uses a modified version of Blake2b that only uses ROUND(0) (I
think - it may be a Lyra2-modified round).  For the main memory hashing,
that's fine.  Someone should check that it is mixing well enough with just
ROUND(0) - probably me!  So long as an attacker has to do the same
computations, I don't care if the data written to memory is
cryptographically indistinguishable from random data.  If it is, I believe
you're spending far too much CPU time hashing data instead of filling
memory.  However, as Alexander put it, there's no excuse for doing a
billion-long chain  of non-cryptographically secure hashes.  I would like
Lyra2 better if it called a full Blake2b round now and then to scramble the
sponge state.  In between 6KiB blocks seems like a good place to me.  That
would give me a warm fuzzy feeling about it's security without slowing it
significantly.

Lyra2 lacks compute-time hardening and Bcrypt-like GPU defense.  Blake2b
computations can be sped up a great deal in ASIC attacks, even if it's
better than Keccak.  External DRAM memory bandwidth is likely only the
speed limiting factor, so I recommend Lyra2 be used with > 30MiB of memory
or more.  This works reasonably well against ASIC/GPU attacks limited by
bandwidth, where maybe attackers have a 10X-ish advantage in
bandwidth/dollar.  That's pretty good defense, IMO.  However,
government-scale attackers may integrate Lyra2 cores directly on advanced
high capacity DRAM die, greatly reducing the bandwidth bottleneck.  Also,
the 6KiB block size is read sequentially, enabling very high speeds on-chip
from the densest available RAM.  Lyra2 has a compile-time option to reduce
the block size, which can be used to compile a version of Lyra2 more well
suited for low-memory cache-bound hashing.  I would prefer to see that as a
runtime option.  Also, Lyra2's second loop lacks the small random reads
similar to what Bcrypt does.  This apparently can be used to harden against
GPU attacks at smaller memory sizes.  To me, small memory hashing that fits
in cache seems rather pathetic for a memory-hard algorithm, so requiring
Lyra2 to bust into DRAM to get decent GPU defense is fine by me.

Finally, I'm not a fan of the backwards incrementing addressing pattern for
the other row to hash in the 1st loop for cache-timing resistance.
 Depending on the XORs to provide defense bothers me since there are so
many cases where XORs have failed us, even in PBKDF2.  Gambit, for example,
showed very strong TMTO defense against my pebbling algorithm at the 1/8th
memory mark even without modeling Gambit's XORs, so I believe it is TMTO
secure.  Without the XORs, Lyra2's first loop is weak against pebbling
attacks, so I need to be convinced that the XORs provide the needed
defense.  Given how XORs have let us down before, that's a difficult bar to
reach.  I would recommend doing a bit more than just an XOR, or changing
the memory access pattern to one that is more secure.

That's all I have for the overall negatives.  Most of this can be fixed, I
think, in the tweak period.  Even with the negatives, Lyra2 is among my
favorite algorithms.  I saw a number of potential goobers in the code.
 These aren't really negatives, just places the authors should double
check:


I think there may be a bug in sse/Sponge.c.  If not, at a comment
explaining how this works is in order.  Here's the Blake2b implementation:

static inline void blake2bLyraSSE(__m128i *v){
    __m128i t0, t1;

    ROUND(0);
    ROUND(1);
    ROUND(2);
    ROUND(3);
    ROUND(4);
    ROUND(5);
    ROUND(6);
    ROUND(7);
    ROUND(8);
    ROUND(9);
    ROUND(10);
    ROUND(11);
}

Here's the ROUND definition:

#define ROUND(r) \
  G1(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
  G2(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
  DIAGONALIZE(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
  G1(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
  G2(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
  UNDIAGONALIZE(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]);
    ROUND_LYRA(11);
}

Macros can be really weird, but it looks to me like ROUND(r) is not a
function of r.  This might cause the SSE version to have an insecure PRK.
 However, it generates the same hash result as the reference version.  Is
this macro really doing a proper Blake2b round, or is this some altered
version?

Here's another minor point  in the code:  Is this legal?

    __m128i *wholeMatrix = malloc(nRows * rowLenBytes);

I've seen code like this crash on some platforms.  Malloc only guarantees
8-byte boundary alignment, and this requires 16-byte alignment.
 Using posix_memalign or similar should fix it.

There's a minor printf mistake in Main.c, line 214, memory size says
'bits', but should be 'bytes'.  That's a factor of 8X in speed in 1 typo!

Lyra2 allows t_cost == 0, with no wandering phase.  This seems a bit
dangerous...

On line 192 of non-sse Lyra2.c, why xor state[0] with prev?  Since state[0]
is random, xoring with prev leaves it random but different.

Both the reference and SSE optimized code only work for little-endian
architectures.  I didn't see that acknowledged anywhere, but I didn't read
the documentation carefully.  There's still work to be done to support
big-endian machines.

Bill
 
CD: 17ms