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Gmane
From: Tom Roeder <tmroeder <at> google.com>
Subject: [RFC] Simple control-flow integrity
Newsgroups: gmane.comp.compilers.llvm.devel
Date: Monday 10th February 2014 23:33:32 UTC (over 3 years ago)
Hi everyone,

I've been working on control-flow integrity (CFI) techniques over
LLVM, and I'd like to get feedback on these techniques and their
potential usefulness as a part of LLVM. I'd like to submit some
patches for this; I've implemented a version of it, and I've applied
it to large, real-world programs like Chromium to see how well it
holds up in practice.


TL;DR: my CFI pass builds jump tables and adds a fast check to
indirect calls; values that fail the check are passed to a function
defined at compile time. I have added special analysis and
source-level annotations to help deal with the problems of external
function pointers.



Details:

My current implementation works as a pass over a single module
consisting of all the code that the compiler has at LTO time. At the
IR level, this pass:

    1. creates a power-of-two sized InlineAsm jump table (or multiple
jump tables) filled with jump instructions to each address-taken
function.

    2. replaces each such address-taken function with a pointer to the
corresponding location in the appropriate table. Note that these will
be valid function pointers for the purposes of external code.

    3. adds a fast check for pointer safety at each indirect call site:

         a. It forces the pointer into the appropriate table (based on
type information), and checks to see if the pointer changed. Pointers
that were already in the right table will not change, and all other
pointers will. We rewrite the pointer either by masking and adding to
a base pointer, if we can guarantee sufficient table alignment,
otherwise by subtracting from a base, then masking, then adding back
to the base.

         b. If the pointer fails the check, it's passed to a CFI
failure function defined at compile time to handle it. By default, we
define a function written in IR; this function prints out the name of
the function in which the CFI violation happens.




The biggest challenge for such an implementation is functions that are
neither declared nor defined at LTO time. These functions are false
positives for the CFI check. They can occur in at least 3 ways:

    - JIT code, like in the v8 javascript engine, can allocate and
call functions that were not defined at compile time. These functions
are not even external: they just didn’t exist at LTO time.

    - External functions can return pointers to external functions
that were not exposed at LTO time. The canonical example in this class
is dlsym, which is used extensively by many projects. Other commonly
used cases are signal/sigaction (returns the old signal handler),
XSetErrorHandler from X, and std::set_new_handler from the Standard
C++ library. But this happens with any dynamically-linked library that
has a method that returns function pointers.

    - Internal code that takes function pointer arguments can be
passed to external code and have external function pointers passed to
it as arguments. This pattern is used extensively by graphics
libraries, e.g., gtk.




I have some techniques that help handle these false positives:

    - Since CFI violations are passed to an arbitrary function, the
policy for these violations can be set at compile time. For example,
you could run the rewritten code for a while to build up a set of
known false positives, then switch to a CFI failure function that
stopped when it saw something not allowed by the policy. This is
similar to the approach taken by, e.g., AppArmor.

    - my current CFI pass looks for special annotations added to the
source code: these are of the form
__attribute__((annotate("cfi-maybe-external"))) and
__attribute__((annotate("cfi-no-rewrite")))

         - cfi-maybe-external can be applied to pointers and variables
(llvm.ptr.annotation and llvm.var.annotation) and means that this
value sometimes stores external function pointers.

         - cfi-no-rewrite is applied to functions and means that there
are indirect calls in this function that can happen with external
function pointers. The current implementation skips rewriting for
these functions, but it could instead be used to prepopulate a list of
known potential false positives.

    - I have a separate analysis pass called ExternalFunctionAnalysis
that does a fairly naive interprocedural dataflow analysis starting
from cfi-maybe-external annotations and from all places where it can
find external function pointers coming in to the module:

          - if an external function pointer flows into a store that
doesn't flow from an annotated location, then the pass prints a
warning

          - all indirect call sites that flow from annotated
pointers/variables are not rewritten (but this could be used instead
to prepopulate a whitelist of known false positives instead).



As I mentioned, I've used my current implementation to build a version
of Chromium protected with this form of CFI; in the process, I added
sufficient annotations to the Chromium code base to catch all false
positives (or at least: I haven't seen any in my testing so far). I've
also tried it out with other, less immense, projects, like the SPEC
CPU2006 benchmark suite.

Please let me know what you think.

Thanks,

Tom

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